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Case Note 
ENGLISH REFORMULATION OF THE PENALTY RULE 
Relevance in Singapore? 
Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi 
ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis  
[2016] AC 1172; [2015] 3 WLR 1373 
English law on the rule against penalty clauses (“penalty 
rule”) has had a stable if unsatisfactory formulation for a 
while. The courts have long distinguished between liquidated 
damages and a penalty, on the basis that the former is a 
genuine pre-estimate of loss and that the latter is an 
unjustifiable tool used to coerce the performance of a 
contract. These long-standing principles have now to be re-
evaluated in the light of the much-anticipated joint appeals of 
Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi and ParkingEye Ltd 
v Beavis (collectively “Cavendish”). The purpose of this case 
note is to discuss Cavendish and evaluate the impact it might 
have on Singapore law. The immediate task for English law is 
to fully work out the basis and principles of the new rule in 
Cavendish. The impact on Singapore law will depend on how 
that pans out. 
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I. Introduction
1 English law on the rule against penalty clauses (“penalty rule”)
has had a stable if unsatisfactory formulation for a while. The courts
have long distinguished between liquidated damages and a penalty, on
the basis that the former is a genuine pre-estimate of loss and that the
latter is an unjustifiable tool used to coerce the performance of a
contract. Liquidated damages are upheld not only because they embody
the intentions of the contracting parties, but because they also save the
© 2017 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal  
 
court and parties the time and expenses in ascertaining the exact loss 
suffered by the plaintiff. For years, the governing case that laid down the 
distinction between liquidated damages and a penalty is the English case 
of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd1 
(“Dunlop Pneumatic”). In that case, Lord Dunedin had laid down the 
following fundamental propositions:2 
1. Though the parties to the contract who use the words 
‘penalty’ or ‘liquidated damages’ may prima facie be supposed to mean 
what they say, yet the expression used is not conclusive. The Court 
must find out whether the payment stipulated is in truth a penalty or 
liquidated damages. … 
2. The essence of a penalty is a payment of money stipulated as 
in terrorem of the offending party; the essence of liquidated damages 
is a genuine covenanted pre-estimate of damage … 
3. The question whether a sum stipulated is penalty or 
liquidated damages is a question of construction to be decided upon 
the terms and inherent circumstances of each particular contract, 
judged of as at the time of the making of the contract, not as at the 
time of breach … 
4. To assist this task of construction various tests have been 
suggested … Such are: 
(a) It will be held to be a penalty if the sum stipulated 
for is extravagant and unconscionable in amount in 
comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be 
proved to have followed from the breach. 
(b) It will be held to be a penalty if the breach consists 
only in not paying a sum of money, and the sum stipulated is 
a sum greater than the sum which ought to have been paid … 
[this is] truly a corollary to the last test. … 
(c) There is a presumption (but no more) that it is 
penalty when ‘a single lump sum is made payable by way of 
compensation, on the occurrence of one or more or all of 
several events, some of which may occasion serious and 
others but trifling damage’ …[3] 
On the other hand: 
(d) It is no obstacle to the sum stipulated being a 
genuine pre-estimate of damage, that the consequences of the 
breach are such as to make precise pre-estimation almost an 
impossibility. On the contrary, that is just the situation when 
                                                          
1 [1915] AC 79. 
2 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79 
at 86–88. 
3 Citing Lord Watson in Lord Elphinstone v Monkland Iron & Coal Co (1886) 
11 App Cas 332. 
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it is probable that pre-estimated damage was the true bargain 
between the parties …. 
Many have treated Lord Dunedin’s second proposition in Dunlop 
Pneumatic as “an exhaustive dichotomy”,4 thereby focusing the analysis 
on whether the disputed clause was a “genuine pre-estimate” of the 
claimant’s loss. 
2 The Singapore position has followed the English position taken 
in Dunlop Pneumatic for a long time. Thus, in the recent High Court 
decision of iTronic Holdings Pte Ltd v Tan Swee Leon (“iTronic 
Holdings”),5 George Wei J confined himself to the Dunlop Pneumatic 
principles. This was done either on the basis that the Dunlop Pneumatic 
principles are “said to be adequate and applicable in cases involving 
straightforward damages clauses” or because the Court of Appeal had in 
Xia Zhengyan v Geng Changqing6 reaffirmed the applicability of those 
principles in Singapore law.7 
3 These long-standing principles have now to be re-evaluated in 
the light of the much-anticipated joint appeals of Cavendish Square 
Holding BV v Makdessi (“Cavendish v Makdessi”) and ParkingEye Ltd v 
Beavis8 (“ParkingEye v Beavis”) (collectively “Cavendish”). In Cavendish, 
the UK Supreme Court put forward a reformulation of the rule: a clause 
will be a penalty if it relates to a secondary obligation which effect is out 
of all proportion to the legitimate interest sought to be safeguarded by 
the provision. While Wei J in iTronic Holdings acknowledged the 
pending importance of Cavendish, he did not apply it, preferring to 
apply the traditional Dunlop Pneumatic principles. Subsequently, in the 
High Court case of Allplus Holdings Pte Ltd v Phoon Wui Nyen9 (“Allplus 
Holdings”), Foo Tuat Yien JC applied the distinction drawn in Cavendish 
between primary and secondary obligations, marking the first time that 
a Singapore court had applied the new rules introduced by the case. The 
purpose of this case note is to discuss Cavendish and evaluate the impact 
it might have on Singapore law. The immediate task for English law is to 
fully work out the basis and principles of the new rule in Cavendish. The 
impact on Singapore law will depend on how that pans out. Before 
discussing the consequences of Cavendish on English and Singapore law, 
let us first consider the background facts of the joint appeals in 
Cavendish. 
                                                          
4 Chitty on Contracts (H Beale ed) (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 32nd Ed, 2015) 
at para 26-182. 
5 [2016] 3 SLR 663. 
6 [2015] 3 SLR 732. 
7 iTronic Holdings Pte Ltd v Tan Swee Leon [2016] 3 SLR 663 at [175]. 
8 [2016] AC 1172; [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [116]. 
9 [2016] SGHC 144. 
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II. Background facts 
A. Cavendish v Makdessi 
4 In the Cavendish v Makdessi appeal, Makdessi was the founder 
of the largest advertising and marketing communications group in the 
Middle East (“the Group”). By an agreement on 28 February 2008, he 
and a partner agreed to sell their controlling stake in the Group’s 
holding company (“the Company”) to Cavendish. Consequently, 
Cavendish held 60% of the Company while Makdessi and his partner 
retained 40%. 
5 As was typical of acquisition agreements in the marketing 
sector, a proportion of the purchase price represented goodwill. To 
safeguard Cavendish’s interests, cl 11.2 provided that Makdessi shall not, 
until two years after he ceased to hold any shares in the Company or the 
date of any final payment, (a) provide, solicit or accept enquiries/orders 
for goods or services which competed with the Group companies in 
countries in which any of the Group companies carried on businesses; 
(b) divert orders, enquiries or business from any Group company, or 
(c) employ or solicit any senior employee or consultant of any Group 
company. 
6 Significantly, breach of cl 11 and other obligations under the 
contract by Makdessi and his partner would result in the variation of 
Cavendish’s payment of the purchase price. Had there been no breach, 
Cavendish was to pay US$34m upon the completion of the transaction. 
It was then to pay a further US$31.5m into escrow, to be paid out over a 
period of time. It was also to pay an “interim payment” and “final 
payment” 30 days after agreement of the Group’s operating profits for 
2007–2009 and 2007–2011 respectively. On the other hand, if Makdessi 
was in breach of cl 11.2, cl 5.1 provided that Makdessi shall lose his 
entitlement to receive the interim payment and/or the final payment. 
Further, pursuant to cl 5.6, Cavendish would have an option to require 
Makdessi to sell all his remaining shares in the Company to Cavendish 
at a certain price that excluded the value of the goodwill of the business. 
7 Makdessi defended against Cavendish’s invocation of cll 5.1 and 
5.6 on the basis that these clauses were penalty provisions and therefore 
unenforceable. At first instance, Burton J held that the clauses were valid 
and enforceable,10 but the Court of Appeal found to the contrary.11 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously overturned the Court of 
Appeal’s ruling. 
                                                          
10 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi [2012] EWHC 3582 (Comm). 
11 Talal El Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holding BV [2013] EWCA Civ 1539. 
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B. ParkingEye v Beavis 
8 In the second appeal, ParkingEye Ltd managed a car park in a 
retail park owned by the British Airways Pension Fund. ParkingEye 
displayed about 20 large, prominent and legible signs at the entrance of 
and throughout the car park so that any reasonable user would have a 
fair opportunity to read them. 80% of these signs informed that 
ParkingEye had been “solely engaged to provide a traffic space 
maximisation scheme” – users would be limited to a free two-hour 
maximum stay in the car park and a “Parking Charge” of £85 would be 
imposed against any user who overstayed. 
9 Beavis overstayed by nearly an hour and received a “first 
parking charge notice” from ParkingEye. The notice demanded payment 
of £85 within 28 days but also stated that, if Beavis should pay within 
14 days, the sum would be reduced to £50. Beavis ignored this notice, as 
well as a subsequent reminder notice and warning letter. ParkingEye 
then sued Beavis in the County Court to recover the £85. The main 
issue was whether the charge was unenforceable as a penalty, or unfair 
and thus unenforceable under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999. Both the Court of Appeal and the judge at first 
instance found for ParkingEye. Beavis therefore appealed to the 
Supreme Court. 
III. New penalty rule 
10 The two appeals presented a ripe opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to consider afresh the contemporary relevance and operation of 
the penalty rule. In fact, as Lord Mance put it, the two cases occupied 
“opposite ends of a financial spectrum”, thereby affording the Supreme 
Court a clear overview of the pertinent issues.12 It was unanimously 
agreed that the penalty rule should not be abolished, owing to its 
vintage, continued relevance in all major legal systems,13 as well as utility 
in regulating contracts/businesses that are not presently protected by 
legislation.14 Moreover, its retention in English law is consistent with 
other well-established principles such as relief from forfeiture, the equity 
                                                          
12 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [116]. 
13 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [37] (per Lords Neuberger and Sumption), [162]–[167] (per 
Lord Mance) and [263] (per Lord Hodge). 
14 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [38] (per Lords Neuberger and Sumption), [167] (per 
Lord Mance) and [260] (per Lord Hodge). 
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of redemption and the refusal to grant specific performance.15 Nor did 
their Lordships see any basis for extending the penalty rule to cover 
clauses triggered other than by breach of contract, thus refusing to adopt 
the Australian approach taken in Andrews v Australian and New Zealand 
Banking Group Ltd16 (“Andrews”). It was thought that an extension of 
the doctrine behoves legislative intervention.17 Lord Mance also 
explicitly rejected restricting the doctrine such that it does not apply in 
“commercial cases”.18 Apart from there being no basis in authority or 
principle for doing so, it would also remove protection afforded by the 
doctrine in an area where it is frequently invoked. Importantly, what 
amounts to a “commercial case” is difficult to define. Similarly finding 
the proposal unattractive, Lord Hodge pointed out that restricting the 
doctrine to non-commercial cases will likely increase litigation costs 
spent on disputing issues of fact concerning the relative bargaining 
positions of the parties and the competence of their lawyers.19 
11 Although their Lordships neither abolished nor restricted the 
application of the penalty rule, they agreed that it is in need of 
reformulation for clarity and focused application. The restated rule 
focuses on whether the contract provision relates to a secondary 
obligation which effect is entirely disproportionate to the legitimate 
interest protected. Although not new, this re-emphasis on the 
primary/secondary obligation distinction is of importance. The 
reformulation has three essential elements. First, the provision must 
relate to a secondary obligation, as opposed to a primary obligation, for 
it to be caught by the penalty rule. Secondly, the court will determine 
what the innocent party’s legitimate interest is. Thirdly, in order for a 
clause to be struck down as a penalty, its effect must be out of all 
proportion to the legitimate interest that is sought to be protected. 
Indeed, some of the judges had used the expression “extravagant, 
                                                          
15 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [39]. 
16 (2012) 247 CLR 205, noted in J W Carter, W Courtney, E Peden, A Stewart & 
G J Tolhurst, “Contractual Penalties: Resurrecting the Equitable Jurisdiction” 
(2013) 30 JCL 99; R Manly, “Breach No Longer Necessary: The High Court’s 
Reconsideration of the Penalty Doctrine” (2013) 41 Australian Business Law 
Review 314 and S Harder, “The Relevance of Breach to the Applicability of the Rule 
Against Penalties” (2013) 30 JCL 52. 
17 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [43]. 
18 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [168]. 
19 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [267]. 
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unconscionable and extortionate” to express this idea.20 Each of these 
points requires fuller elaboration. 
12 First and foremost, the application of this rule depends on a 
distinction drawn between a primary obligation and a secondary 
obligation; only the latter brings the rule into play.21 Other than the 
classical example of a secondary obligation to pay a sum of money upon 
a breach of contract,22 an obligation to transfer assets either for nothing 
or at undervalue, as well as a sum paid over to another party as a deposit 
could also be construed as secondary obligations.23 On the other hand, 
a conditional primary obligation, which may provide for the payment of 
a sum of money if the other party fails to perform an act, does not 
attract the penalty rule.24 
13 Secondly, Lords Neuberger, Sumption and Carnwath clarified 
that Lord Dunedin’s four tests in Dunlop Pneumatic are not rules but 
considerations that indicated whether a clause is an unenforceable 
penalty.25 The true test of “penalty” is not dependent upon whether the 
clause prescribes for a genuine pre-estimate of the loss or whether its 
purpose is deterrence; these are “not natural opposites or mutually 
exclusive categories”.26 Instead, its essence lies in evaluating whether the 
effect of the secondary obligation is clearly excessive in relation to the 
innocent party’s legitimate interest, even if their Lordships each used 
slightly different terminology.27 “Penalty” is thus not prescribed as an 
absolute standard. Their Lordships also stressed that there can be no 
proper interest in simply punishing the defaulting party.28 
                                                          
20 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [181], [255] and [293]. 
21 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [12] (per Lords Neuberger and Sumption). 
22 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [16]. 
23 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [16]. 
24 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [14]. 
25 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [22]. 
26 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [31] (per Lords Neuberger and Sumption), [225] and [248] 
(per Lord Hodge). 
27 See, eg, Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] 
AC 1172; [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [22] (per Lords Neuberger and Sumption), [154] 
(per Lord Mance) and [221] (per Lord Hodge). 
28 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [32]. 
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14 Finally, some factors that are relevant to determining whether 
the innocent party’s legitimate interest justifies the protection prescribed 
include circumstances in which the contract was made.29 Where the 
contract was concluded between parties of comparable bargaining 
power and both of whom were legally advised, Lords Neuberger, 
Sumption and Carnworth said that there is a “strong initial 
presumption” that the parties are aware of the consequences of the 
penalty clause, which implies that it should be upheld.30 
IV. Application of reformulated penalty rule 
A. Cavendish v Makdessi 
15 Whilst all the members of the Supreme Court applied the same 
test to cll 5.1 and 5.6 and agreed that they were valid and enforceable, 
their Lordships’ analyses differed somewhat. The disagreement is 
particularly evident in respect of the threshold issue of whether the 
clauses related to secondary obligations. Lords Neuberger, Sumption 
and Carnwath found that cll 5.1 and 5.6 were provisions of primary 
obligations. They characterised cl 5.1 as a price adjustment clause that 
affected the consideration earned by Makdessi and his partner under the 
contract. Clause 5.1 implemented this by imposing a substantial delayed 
payment to protect the goodwill of the business.31 Their Lordships also 
concluded that cl 5.6, in conferring an option to acquire the shares, 
related to a primary obligation even if it only becomes relevant upon a 
breach of contract.32 Clause 5.6 similarly reflected the reduced price that 
Cavendish was prepared to pay for the shares in the event of Makdessi’s 
disloyalty.33 On this analysis, the penalty rule would not even apply. 
16 On the other hand, Lord Mance, in his analysis of cll 5.1 and 
5.6, focused on whether Cavendish had a legitimate interest that 
justified their imposition. This therefore assumed that the provisions 
were secondary obligations.34 Indeed, in respect of cl 5.1, Lord Mance 
rejected Cavendish’s argument that it was in substance a price formula 
                                                          
29 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [35]. 
30 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [35]; see also [152] (per Lord Mance). 
31 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [74] and [77]. 
32 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [83]. 
33 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [81]. 
34 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [171]–[181] and [182]–[186]. 
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founded on the provision in cl 3.1 that the agreed payments were in 
consideration of the shares and the sellers’ obligations. 35 Somewhat 
equivocally, however, Lord Mance acknowledged that cl 5.6 redefined 
the parties’ “primary relationship”.36 
17 In contrast, Lord Hodge expressly construed cl 5.6 as a 
secondary obligation designed to deter the sellers from breaching their 
obligations under cl 11.2.37 Yet, in respect of cl 5.1, his Lordship’s analysis 
was a little more obscure. While acknowledging that there was a “strong 
argument” that cl 5.1 was in substance a primary obligation, his 
Lordship analysed cl 5.1 on the assumption that it was a secondary 
obligation caught by the penalty rule.38 
18 Without appreciating the distinctions in analyses, Lord Toulson 
stated his agreement with Lords Mance and Hodge in Cavendish.39 Even 
more confusingly, Lord Clarke agreed with the reasoning of 
Lords Neuberger, Sumption, Mance and Hodge.40 Whether a clear 
majority was ultimately reached on the nature of the obligations 
prescribed under cll 5.1 and 5.6 is therefore unclear. 
19 Lords Neuberger, Sumption and Carnwath considered that, 
even if cl 5.1 defined the parties’ secondary obligations, Cavendish had a 
legitimate interest in Makdessi’s observance of the restrictive covenants 
insofar as the goodwill of the business was concerned.41 It was 
immaterial that it had no relationship with the measure of loss 
attributable to breach. Also, that cl 5.6 had a deterrent effect was not the 
point since Cavendish had a legitimate interest “in matching the price of 
the retained shares to the value that the [s]ellers were contributing to the 
business”.42 It was commercially sensible that Cavendish should not pay 
for goodwill where the defaulting shareholders were no longer 
                                                          
35 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [179]. 
36 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [183]. 
37 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [280]. 
38 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [270] and the analysis from [271]–[278]. 
39 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [292]. 
40 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [291]. 
41 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [75]. 
42 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [82]. 
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contributing to the goodwill of the Company or were actively 
reducing it.43 
20 Lord Mance emphasised that the proper approach is to focus on 
the overall purpose of the covenants, rather than on the individual 
breaches.44 By this approach, Lord Mance concluded that cll 5.1 and 5.6 
were concerned with the damage from competitive activity. Applying 
Lord Parker’s analysis in Dunlop Pneumatic, there was accordingly no 
penal presumption against cll 5.1 and 5.6.45 Furthermore, Lord Mance 
said that cl 5.1 was part of a carefully negotiated agreement between 
informed and legally advised parties who were conscious of the 
importance of the Group’s goodwill to Cavendish.46 As for cl 5.6, 
Lord Mance regarded the essential question as this: whether it can be 
regarded as “exorbitant or unconscionable” once Makdessi had breached 
the restrictive covenants and affected the goodwill of the Group.47 His 
Lordship was of the view that cl 5.6 was a “natural provision” to include 
as a consequence of breach that affected the goodwill of the Group, 
which in turn necessitated the complete severance of relationships 
between the parties.48 
21 Lord Hodge paid particular emphasis on the fact that the parties 
had attributed a high value to the goodwill of the Group and this was 
reflected in the consideration paid.49 Lord Hodge considered as 
“unrealistic” that cl 5.1 could be triggered by a minor breach of cl 11.2 
since cl 5.1 was aimed at addressing the disloyalty of a seller who 
attacked the company’s goodwill.50 It follows that cl 5.1 was entirely 
commensurate with Cavendish’s legitimate interests.51 As for cl 5.6, while 
noting that the defaulting shareholder option price was harsh, 
Lord Hodge held that it was not exorbitant because goodwill was critical 
                                                          
43 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [82]. 
44 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [172]. 
45 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [173]–[174]. 
46 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [180]–[181]. 
47 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [185]. 
48 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [185]. 
49 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [271]–[272]. 
50 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [275]. 
51 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [278]. 
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for the success of the sale in (especially) the Middle Eastern context.52 
Clause 5.6 was also not unconscionable as it was part of a contract that 
was negotiated in detail by parties who were of relatively equal 
bargaining power and legally advised.53 
B. ParkingEye v Beavis 
22 The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the clause in 
ParkingEye v Beavis concerned a secondary obligation, and was 
therefore subject to the penalty rule. Lords Neuberger, Sumption and 
Carnwath explained that the parking charge could not be characterised 
as consideration for parking (and therefore a primary obligation) 
because it was imposed for breaches other than overstaying and 
importantly, it was not imposed based on a time period for which the 
motorists could stay after the initial two hours of free parking.54 
23 However, the fact that ParkingEye suffered no loss by the 
motorists’ overstaying at the car park due to it not having proprietary 
interest in the property did not render the contractual provision penal.55 
The motorists would not care whether it was the landowner or 
ParkingEye who operated the parking scheme. Importantly, it was held 
that ParkingEye had a legitimate interest to protect. The legitimate 
interest arose out of the outsourcing arrangement between the 
landowner and ParkingEye: ParkingEye provided a valuable service of 
maximising the use of car park spaces which benefited the landowner, 
retailers operating on site and their customers, and this service was 
funded by charges paid by the car park overstayers.56 
24 The more difficult question is whether ParkingEye’s legitimate 
interest justified the imposition of the £85 charge. It was held that it was 
not excessive to constitute a penalty. In coming to their conclusion, 
Lords Neuberger, Sumption, Carnwath, Mance and Hodge placed 
considerable weight on the fact that the scheme was transparent because 
                                                          
52 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [282]. 
53 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [282]. 
54 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [94]. Lord Mance (at [130]) acknowledged that ParkingEye 
could have economic reasons (eg, tax issues) for formulating the clause as an 
obligation arising upon breach. 
55 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [99]. 
56 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [99] (per Lords Neuberger and Sumption), [197] (per 
Lord Mance) and [287] (per Lord Hodge). 
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incoming motorists were amply informed by the prominent signs on the 
risk of incurring the £85 charge.57 Lords Neuberger, Sumption, 
Carnwath and Hodge also considered that £85 was below the maximum 
amount prescribed by the British Parking Association in relation to 
charges for public car parks beyond which justification would be 
required. Lord Mance gave other reasons. He found that £85 was not so 
high a sum that no ordinary customer would wish to incur.58 He further 
said that the charge was justified by the fact that ParkingEye, a specialist 
contractor in this case, had to make a profit from the endeavour. 
25 Although it does not apply in Singapore, for completeness, it 
should be noted that Lord Toulson dissented from the majority view 
that the £85 charge was not unfair under the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999, an issue that required an inquiry into the 
relationship between regulation and the penalty rule. This commentary 
only focuses on the common law doctrine of penalty. 
V. Some reflections on the penalty rule 
A. Basis of the penalty rule 
26 The Supreme Court’s decision also raises several points for 
reflection. First of all, it establishes that the doctrine is not against 
penalties in contracts per se. Instead, the rule is firmly established in the 
public policy of regulating contractual relationships between parties of 
unequal bargaining power, especially relationships that are not presently 
protected by consumer regulations or the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977.59 More precisely, it is a limited form of common law protection of 
parties in weaker bargaining positions from being forced to agree to 
manifestly disadvantageous and oppressive terms. The protection is, 
however, limited in two principal ways. First, it only attacks secondary 
obligations. Parties are free to agree to onerous primary obligations. As 
such, the reformulated penalty rule affirms the centrality of the 
compensatory principle for breach of contract – proper justification is 
required for the innocent party to be entitled to more than 
compensation. Secondly, the reformulated rule integrates a balancing 
exercise between the innocent party’s legitimate interest and unfairness 
to the breaching party. Implicit in the balancing exercise is also the 
recognition that compensation for breach of contract is not always 
                                                          
57 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [100] (per Lords Neuberger and Sumption), [198] (per 
Lord Mance) and [287] (per Lord Hodge). 
58 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [198]. 
59 c 50 (UK). 
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sufficient. Indeed, the actual performance of the primary obligations by 
one party may be significant for the other party when taking a wider 
view of the latter’s interests. English contract law protects this interest 
not by granting specific performance liberally, but by allowing parties 
the liberty to prescribe the primary obligations in their agreement and a 
modicum of freedom in providing for non-compensatory consequences 
upon breach of the primary obligations where the circumstances of the 
case so justify. The reformulated rule is thus consistent with the 
principle of party autonomy, a central tenet of English contract law.60 
27 More specifically, if, after Cavendish, it is understood that the 
English penalty rule is not against “penalties” that can otherwise be 
justified, there may be a need to reconsider the objection against 
awarding punitive damages for breach of a contract,61 which is said to be 
justified by the penalty doctrine.62 Could it be argued that the English 
courts should award punitive damages for breach of contract where the 
innocent party is able to demonstrate that it has legitimate interests that 
go beyond compensation? It may be that the Cavendish reformulation 
does not automatically lead to such an outcome. The refusal to award 
punitive damages for breach of contract is consistent with the English 
tradition of contract law. It is one thing to uphold party autonomy and 
quite another for contract law to prescribe a more expansive range of 
remedies from an ex post perspective. 
28 Understanding the basis of the reformulated rule brings further 
illumination on the operation of the rule. It is to the elements of the rule 
which we now turn. 
B. Distinction between “primary obligations” and “secondary 
obligations” 
29 Cavendish reveals a genuine difficulty in distinguishing between 
primary obligations and secondary obligations in complex commercial 
transactions. Yet, this threshold issue is significant as it determines 
whether the penalty rule is brought into play in the first place. Modern 
commercial contracts often involve complex drafting prescribing a web 
of correlated clauses, rendering the distinction between primary and 
secondary obligations far less bright-line than expected. Indeed, it may 
be possible to avoid the penalty rule through careful drafting, which 
                                                          
60 Cf K Barnett, “Before the High Court: Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group Ltd: Are Late Payment Fees on Credit Cards Enforceable” (2015) 
37 Syd LR 595 at 605. 
61 See, eg, Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488. 
62 S Rowan, Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Protection of Performance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at p 188. 
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may not be in line with the key substantive purpose behind the rule in 
the first place. Yet, there is a limit to good drafting, principally because 
the courts are always going to be concerned with substance over form. 
Moreover, parties may not wish to disclose fully their wider commercial 
interests for reasons of confidentiality obligations, competition and so 
forth. 
30 The better view is that the “secondary obligation” prerequisite 
operates as a gatekeeping device to prevent excessive judicial 
interference with the parties’ bargain. The crux of the rule probably lies 
in the posterior analysis of whether the effect of the clause is manifestly 
excessive or entirely out of proportion to the legitimate interest of the 
innocent party. Yet, sole reliance on the balancing exercise to limit 
judicial intervention is not entirely secure. Commercial parties can 
always point to a legitimate commercial interest and whether the effect 
of the contractual provision is excessive or exorbitant by reference to the 
commercial interest is ultimately a value judgment63 – a judgment that 
may be difficult to make in less clear-cut cases. The “secondary 
obligation” prerequisite is a rigid but moderately effective way of 
reducing the scope of operation. 
31 Underpinning the characterisation exercise is the query 
concerning the value of freedom of contract. Modern commerce cannot 
be understood on the paradigm case of a simple sale and purchase 
agreement – if we keep to such a model, the law will find modern 
drafting objectionable on the basis of simplistic and anachronistic 
understanding. After all, the court is not better placed than parties to 
determine the core interests of their transactions. 
C. What is a legitimate interest? 
32 Indeed, the requirement of a legitimate interest amounts to 
judicial recognition that parties are best placed to protect their own 
non-compensatory interests. This will especially be the case if the 
particular contract in dispute is merely part of a web of contracts or a 
wider transaction with far-reaching implications if that particular 
contract in dispute has been breached. This may explain why their 
Lordships said “legitimate interests” is to be determined by considering 
the transaction as a whole and one might have to look beyond that one 
contract into the wider background to understand fully its objectives 
and the commercial interests at stake. 
                                                          
63 See, eg, Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] 
AC 1172; [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [249] (per Lord Hodge). 
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33 Whilst in many cases legitimate interests are commercial 
interests, their Lordships acknowledged that the concept is not so 
limited.64 A sideways glance may be cast at the law of account of profits 
for breach of contract. An account of profits may be exceptionally 
awarded for breach of contract where the innocent party can 
demonstrate that it has a legitimate interest to protect, warranting the 
grant of a non-compensatory remedy. In the seminal case of Attorney 
General v Blake,65 a double agent wrote a book about his secret services 
work and was sued by the Crown for the profits he made on the book. In 
this case, the normal remedy was insufficient to compensate for breach 
of contract, with the national security of ensuring that the secret service 
could operate in complete confidence being deemed a legitimate 
interest. There is no reason why a similarly non-commercial interest 
cannot amount to a legitimate interest justifying prescription of non-
compensatory consequences for breach of contract. 
D. Proportionality 
34 Of course, that the innocent party has a legitimate interest to 
protect is insufficient – it must be further shown that the effect of the 
provision is not entirely excessive of the said interest. It is in essence a 
question of proportionality. Fairness and reasonableness are the 
overarching themes. Factors such as whether reasonable notice of the 
allegedly penal term has been given to the other party is therefore 
relevant, as can be seen in the ParkingEye v Beavis appeal. Or, as in the 
Cavendish v Makdessi appeal, whether the parties are of roughly equal 
bargaining power and have been legally advised in entering into the 
transaction; and whether the innocent party’s “legitimate interest” has 
been made known to the other contracting party at the time of 
contracting. 
35 The ParkingEye v Beavis appeal also shows that relevant 
statutory or industry guidelines may be drawn upon in measuring 
proportionality. In this connection, it may be that the same factors that 
are used to determine the reasonableness of an exemption clause under 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act and similar regulations66 would also be 
                                                          
64 See, eg, Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] 
AC 1172; [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [162] (per Lord Mance) and [256] (per 
Lord Hodge). 
65 [2001] 1 AC 268. 
66 For example, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
(SI 1999/2083) – there was a separate issue in the ParkingEye v Beavis appeal as to 
whether the parking charge was in contravention of the said regulation. 
Cf Lord Toulson, in his lone dissent, expressed the view that the approach under 
the Regulations 1999 is not necessarily the same as in the approach under the 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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highly relevant in determining the proportionality of a consequence to a 
legitimate interest. If so, there is already an established body of case law 
that the courts can use in relation to the penalty rule. 
36 There remains one issue that requires judicial elucidation. The 
Cavendish v Makdessi appeal concerned two provisions in the contract 
which prescribed for separate consequences in the event that Makdessi 
became a “defaulting shareholder”. Perhaps owing to the characterisation 
complexity discussed above, the Supreme Court did not consider67 the 
issue whether provisions that prescribe for separate consequences in the 
event of the same breach could cumulatively be regarded as penal and 
unenforceable, even though each considered individually may not be 
penal. There is a case to be made that cumulative effect should be 
relevant under the penalty doctrine, especially where the innocent party 
seeks to enforce the relevant provisions together, thereby enhancing the 
harshness of the impact upon the party in breach. Otherwise, 
contracting parties may escape the penalty rule by setting out the 
consequences of breach in separate provisions. 
VI. Impact on Singapore law 
37 A limited effect of Cavendish can be observed in iTronic 
Holdings. Relying on the English ruling for illustration,68 Wei J 
addressed the distinction between a primary obligation and a secondary 
obligation. Following Singapore precedents, Wei J had no reason to 
doubt that the distinction is part of Singapore law and the penalty rule 
only applies to secondary obligations.69 In iTronic Holdings, the essence 
of the agreement between the parties is that the plaintiffs were to loan 
the defendant the sum specified. If the defendant succeeded in his 
attempt to list the company concerned, the plaintiffs could choose to 
convert the loans into $3m worth of shares. If the plaintiffs chose not to 
do that, they can ask for repayment of the principal sum and also 
additional sums, which were termed “compensation sums”. The question 
was whether the “compensation sums” were a remedy for a breach of a 
primary obligation, which would make them a secondary obligation. 
Wei J held that they were not. The defendant’s repayment obligation is 
really a conditional primary obligation. As such, the penalty rule does 
not apply. 
                                                                                                                               
common law doctrine of penalty. See Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; 
Parkingeye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [295]–[316]. 
67 Lord Mance came the closest to considering the issue when he addressed the effect 
of cl 5.6 and how the clause was necessary in an event of disloyalty to effect 
severance of the parties’ relationship. 
68 iTronic Holdings Pte Ltd v Tan Swee Leon [2016] 3 SLR 663 at [167]. 
69 iTronic Holdings Pte Ltd v Tan Swee Leon [2016] 3 SLR 663 at [165]. 
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38 In Allplus Holdings, Foo JC also discussed the distinction 
between primary and secondary obligations. In her view, the distinction 
lies with whether “there was an obligation on a party to perform an act 
for which a failure to do so would trigger a further obligation to pay a 
specific sum of money”.70 If there was such an obligation, the obligation 
to pay the sum of money would be a secondary obligation that is subject 
to the penalty rule. On the facts of that case, because the impugned cl 4 
stated the consequence of non-compliance with cl 1, it was in substance 
a secondary obligation that was subject to the penalty rule. 
39 The Singapore courts’ consideration of the primary and 
secondary obligation distinction cannot be faulted. Their emphasis on 
the need for these clauses to be evaluated substantively would deter 
parties from seeking to get around the penalty rule by clever drafting. 
Nevertheless, the true significance of the primary and secondary 
obligation distinction behoves a full review by the Singapore Court of 
Appeal. Cavendish has come at a time when the penalty rule is 
undergoing changes elsewhere in the common law world. The primary 
and secondary obligation distinction limits the scope of the English 
reformulated rule to strike at only clauses prescribing secondary 
obligations. It signals English preference for more tempered judicial 
interference with parties’ freedom to contract. By contrast, in the High 
Court of Australia case of Andrews, the penalty rule was extended to 
cover situations other than breach of contract. Andrews has been widely 
criticised for increasing commercial risks by broadening the application 
of the penalty rule to a number of common contractual mechanisms 
that do not involve breach.71 In the subsequent High Court of Australia 
case of Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd72 
(“Paciocco”), the majority,73 affirming the decision of the Full Court of 
the Federal Court below,74 held that credit card late payment fees are not 
a penalty as long as they are not “out of all proportion” to the charging 
bank’s interests. Dunlop Pneumatic and Andrews remain good law in 
Australia, although the Paciocco dispute did not concern the 
controversial extension in Andrews. Notably, French CJ emphasised that 
the “common law of Australia” has diverged from English developments 
and that convergence between the common law jurisdictions – desirable 
                                                          
70 Allplus Holdings Pte Ltd v Phoon Wui Nyen [2016] SGHC 144 at [19]. 
71 See, eg, J W Carter, W Courtney, E Peden, A Stewart & G J Tolhurst, “Contractual 
Penalties: Resurrecting the Equitable Jurisdiction” (2013) 30 JCL 99; R Manly, 
“Breach No Longer Necessary: The High Court’s Reconsideration of the Penalty 
Doctrine” (2013) 41 Australian Business Law Review 314 and S Harder, “The 
Relevance of Breach to the Applicability of the Rule Against Penalties” (2013) 
30 JCL 52. 
72 [2016] HCA 28. 
73 Comprising French CJ, Kiefel, Keane and Gageler JJ; Nettle J dissenting. 
74 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2015] FCAFC 50. 
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in commercial law – may not be best brought about through the 
common law process.75 Paciocco would provide guidance for the 
upcoming appeal of the New Zealand High Court’s judgment in 
Torchlight Fund No 1 LP v Johnstone,76 a case which applied New South 
Wales law and similarly involved a late payment fee clause. 
40 In the final analysis, although the penalty rule was derived from 
Dunlop Pneumatic, the common law system requires lawyers in each 
generation to critically consider whether the principles that have been 
inherited remain sensible and adequate. Ultimately, the question is one 
of reform: what is the scope of operation of the penalty rule and the 
appropriate test to be applied? How Singapore law will choose and what 
its contribution to the ongoing debate remains to be seen. But any 
proposed alterations must be supported by principle and policy. To 
some extent, whether Singapore will join the company of English law 
will depend on the impact of Cavendish on English law and practice. 
 
                                                          
75 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28  
at [9]–[10]. 
76 [2015] NZHC 25. 
